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Discussion after the Speeches of James H. Carter
and Professor Jean-Gabriel Castel
QUESTION, Mr. Coombe: Jim Carter raised some reasonable concerns
pertaining to the potential for intrusion of courts in United States arbi-
tration matters. My question, however, is can most of those problems be
resolved by drafting? The problem facing arbitration is that people have
not been trained in drafting arbitration clauses adequate to deal with the
compentency of arbitrators to pass on arbitrability. Moreover, these pro-
visions must expressly be included in the clause, as should the problems
of provisional remedies and the problems of discovery. Would these not
be recognized on the four corners of the act?
ANSWER, Mr. Carter: There is a basic philosophical difference in the
arbitration community as to how an arbitration clause should be drafted.
One of the advantages of arbitration is relative simplicity, which means
relative standardization. We have gone a long way in legislative drafting
so that a fairly simple clause, like a Triple "A" clause, can be taken out
of a pamphlet and put in a contract, and it will bring in a whole lot of
things that will solve a host of problems. That is a wonderful thing. I
am a strong believer in such simplicity. But if you start saying that, "In
addition, we want a little bit of discovery, but not too much; and in addi-
tion, we want to be sure there are not any punitive damages; and in addi-
tion, concerning the governing law clause where we said the law of
California applies, we did not mean our international arbitration stat-
ute," every lawyer is going to have his own version of what this clause
ought to look like. The reality is, when drafting such an agreement,
when "clause twenty-nine," (the arbitration clause), is reached, nobody
really wants to have two lawyers with their own versions of all these
details battling it out.
Simple inclusion of clauses can be accomplished with varying de-
grees of success., If the arbitrators are to be the sole judges of arbi-
trability, most courts would hold that such provisions would override the
language in Chapter One of the Federal Arbitrations Act. But the price
of uniformity may be a very high one.
QUESTION, Mr. Gerhart: Given the concept of lex mercatoria, which
is popular in Europe, would you comment on how a U.S. court might
react if asked to confirm or enforce an award based on that principle?
ANSWER, Mr. Carter: I do not think it presents much of a problem in
the United States. There is a fairly recent article on lex mercatoria by
Professor Lowenfeld, in which he states the thesis that lex mercatoria, as
properly understood, is not a concept which is rooted in anybody's law.
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Instead, it is international parts of different concepts on which people
instinctively draw when deciding commercial transactions. The courts
will likely hold that the parties bargained for it, and, therefore, they will
apply it.
QUESTION, Mr. Miller: Is arbitration broad enough to include media-
tion for legal purposes? That is, could an agreement to mediate be con-
sidered an agreement to submit to arbitration for legal purposes, and thus
provide a legislative framework for mediation as well?
ANSWER, Professor Castel: If you are thinking of a clause that would
only deal with mediation, but that states no more than that, I would say
no. If the parties agree only to mediate, that is not arbitration. The two
are separate and distinct institutions. Our courts would take literal inter-
pretation and go no further. You could not interpret an agreement to
mediate as an agreement to arbitrate unless you have a clause that was
quite clear on that point.
QUESTION, Professor King: The ICSID, the International Convention
for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, is a convention that many
countries are involved in where disputes between a country and an inves-
tor are subject to the enforcement provisions of the convention. The
question is, what has been the U.S. courts' approach towards the enforce-
ment of those awards?
ANSWER, Mr. Carter: We have not received a whole lot of law con-
cerning this, unfortunately. The ICSID, which is a branch of the World
Bank, has had short of thirty cases filed in its long life. There have not
been many awards, and fortunately, most of those have been complied
with. Therefore, there is a gap of case law here. The cases that have
come before a U.S. court have been treated much like any other award.
They all have been straightforward even though they were awards
against a sovereign. As long as they had clearly gone through the arbi-
tration process, that was sufficient. The one case where they did not go
through the process caused some problems.
The big difficulty with ICSID is that it has gotten itself tangled up
because it has an internal review procedure. Because ICSID is a body
where investment claims are resolved against sovereigns, the draftsmen
came to the conclusion that some way was needed to review the decisions
because they were not supposed to be reviewed by municipal courts on
the merits. An internal review before the award becomes final was cre-
ated. Having discovered that about twenty cases into the process, ICSID
has now been doing it to every decision. It has caused a lot of anxiety for
people with ICSID clauses in their agreement. They wonder whether
they will ever see the day when they will be able to have an award to take
to a court to enforce. If they get there, I think the courts will love it.
QUESTION, Mr. Coombe: How do you stand on replacing the Federal
Act with the Model Act?
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ANSWER, Mr. Carter: Let's do it.
QUESTION, Mr. Coombe: Is it politically opportune to do so?
ANSWER, Mr. Carter: For most people, it is not politically opportune
right now. Most people who have reviewed the UNCITRAL Model
Law, since it came along in the mid 1980s as a possibility for the United
States, have argued that we do not need it. The pro-status-quo side of the
argument is that we have a lot of developed case law interpreting a stat-
ute that is uniform across domestic and international law. To some ex-
tent it is uniform across commercial laws since the Federal Arbitrations
Act applies to other areas as well. These people do not want to throw
out all this case law. They believe that we can find the answers under
U.S. arbitration. However, it is very hard to do that. You really have to
read the cases. You cannot just pick up the statute and find an answer.
One would think that a "user-friendly" system of law ought to be some-
what more transparent. Additionally, as we begin to have states thinking
that it is a good idea for various reasons to enact a state version of the
UNCITRAL Model Law, we are creating a number of conflict issues and
we are unsettling the law somewhat anyway.
Finally, on the non-status-quo side, I would say that we are seeing a
number of other places around the world implementing something based
on the UNCITRAL Model Law. It is the trend in Canada. It is the law
in Australia, Scotland, Hong Kong and more. We are going to live in a
world where UNCITRAL Model Law concepts, which are not very dif-
ferent from our current law, are going to be the law. We ought to be
moving toward standardization and transparency for users.
QUESTION, Professor King: Would you comment about the state laws
and how you regard them as development in terms of the growth of the
arbitration industry?
ANSWER, Mr. Carter: Somewhere between pernicious and inconve-
nient. They were enacted in a number of cases in states which had very
antiquated domestic arbitration laws generally, and were not put in the
Uniform Model Law or had some lacuna accumulate in domestic arbitra-
tion law by bad decisions. An argument was that federal law will pre-
empt it. Well, this is a pretty bad argument, muddying the waters still
further. But the Volt case tells us that the federal law does not pre-empt
many things. It has left it unclear what federal law does and does not
pre-empt. It does not pre-empt anything that is not directly in conflict
with the Federal Arbitrations Act, but there are very few things in the
Federal Arbitrations Act to such a degree of specificity that you can say
that the standard has been met. It is supposed to pre-empt laws that are
unfriendly to the general idea of pro-arbitration. For instance, a state
statute says that you cannot arbitrate real estate disputes. Short of that,
what would a state do that would be so directly contrary to arbitration
that it would be inconsi Vent?
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That leaves a lot of room for litigation. I guess in twenty years we
will have litigated most of the possibilities. It seems to me they have
created problems for us with no great plus.
QUESTION, Professor King: Mr. Castel, Canadians do not have a prob-
lem with this because the entire country has adopted the same law. The
provinces have adopted the Model Law, correct?
ANSWER, Professor Castel: In the internationial commercial field, we
have the same law across the country including the territories, and at the
federal level, too. But the federal law is restricted to federal matters and
the rest applies to provincial matters. So we have a uniform law. On the
provincial level, as it was pointed out earlier, we have the Arbitration
Acts which deal with domestic arbitration. Ontario is trying to adopt a
new version of that legislation. I do not know if the new government is
going to present a new bill again. Basically there are two statutes which
more or less implement the UNCITRAL Model Law.
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